El profesor Michael Wheeler presenta el míercoles 20 el siguiente argumento en la universidad de Edimburgo (Abstract):
"Advocates of extended cognition hold that the physical machinery of mind
sometimes extends beyond the skull and skin. In the first part of this
talk, I explain why, and more specifically the precise sense in which,
consciousness presents such theorists
with an extra hurdle to be cleared. The key challenge is posed by
phenomenal consciousness, the what-it's-like-ness of experience. I
consider two arguments for the claim that the physical machinery of
phenomenal consciousness sometimes extends beyond the skull
and skin. The first – the argument from sensory substitution – suggests
that acceptance of extended phenomenal consciousness should follow from
a careful analysis of the phenomenon in which technological
augmentation enables one sensory modality, for instance
touch, to support the kind of environmental access and interaction
ordinarily supported by a different sensory modality, for instance
vision. The second argument – the argument from the relational character
of experience – suggests that acceptance of extended
phenomenal consciousness should follow from a particular conception of
conscious experience that is mandated by sensorimotor contingency
theory. I conclude that neither argument is decisive".
-V., también, el video que he insertado en la entrada sobre OTROS PROBLEMAS Y CONTROVERSIAS