NUEVAS OBJECIONES

 Jakob Hohwy presenta hoy en la Universidad de Edimburgo una interesante objeción a las tesis de la mente extendida basada en una concepción del cerebro que está alcanzando notable difusión. Este es el resumen de su intervención

Abstract: The most exciting theory in neuroscience is that the brain is an organ for prediction error minimization (PEM). This theory is rapidly gaining influence and is set to dominate the science of the mind and the brain in the years to come. PEM has extreme explanatory ambition, and profound philosophical implications. Here, I assume the theory, briefly explain it, and then I develop the idea that PEM implies that the brain is essentially self-evidencing. This means it is imperative to define an evidentiary boundary between the brain and its environment. This boundary defines the mind-world relation, opens the door to global skepticism, and makes the mind transpire as more inferentially secluded and neurocentrically skull-bound than many would nowadays think. PEM's strongly neurocentric character means it deflates contemporary hypotheses that cognition is extended and embodied, but in spite of this it can accommodate the kinds of cases that fuel these hypotheses.